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Check Point · Multiple Products

CVE-2026-123039

CVE-2026-123039 - Local privilege escalation to root in the DynamicCLI process via local world-writable control socket

CISA KEV
Known exploitedadded 13 Nov 2026; US federal deadline 16 Nov 2026
Exploit likelihood
2.2%83rd percentile · FIRST EPSS, 2026-11-15
Severity
7.8 HighCVSS (version not stated), Check Point; Check Point's Security Alert: High
Last verified
13 Nov 2026against the sources below

1In plain language

On affected Check Point products, the Gaia OS Dynamic CLI process (dynamic_server) runs as root and listens on a local socket that is world-writable, without checking who connects. Any authenticated local user can run arbitrary commands as root through it.

It's a local privilege escalation: the attacker must already be able to run code on the appliance.

Check Point has seen it exploited against a couple of dozen customers. CISA added it to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 13 Nov 2026, with a US federal deadline of 16 Nov 2026. Ransomware use: unknown.

2Am I affected?

Affected products: Check Point Force Firewalls, Check Point Management and Log Servers, Multi-Domain Security Management and Multi-Domain Log Server, and Maestro Orchestrator. Not affected: Check Point Spark Firewalls and Smart-1 Cloud.

The advisory's product field names them as Check Point Firewall, Multi-Domain Security Management Server, Scalable Platforms, Security Gateway and Security Management Server.

Affected versions: R82.20, R82.10, R82, R81.20, R81.10 and R81. Check Point marks R81.10 and R81 as end of support (EOS).

Affected releases are summarised by release train in the Fix table.

Check your version

Check Point's check that the fix is in place: run this command. A fixed box shows srw-rw---- root config (0660), not srwxrwxrwx (0777).

> ls -l /tmp/dynamic_socket

In the output, look at the /tmp/dynamic_socket line.

A command to show the installed version and Jumbo Hotfix take: Not stated by vendor.

3Fix

Check Point fixed it in the Jumbo Hotfix Accumulator takes below. The fix blocks and logs unauthenticated calls to the Dynamic CLI command.

Check Point lists no fix for R81.10 or R81, which it marks as end of support. For those, the mitigation below is the only remediation step the advisory gives. our analysis

VersionAffectedWhat Check Point says to install
R82.20R82.20 without the fixJumbo Hotfix Accumulator for R82.20 starting from Take 14
R82.10R82.10 without the fixJumbo Hotfix Accumulator for R82.10 starting from Take 52
R82R82 without the fixJumbo Hotfix Accumulator for R82 starting from Take 132
R81.20R81.20 without the fixJumbo Hotfix Accumulator for R81.20 starting from Take 174
R81.10 (EOS)R81.10Not stated by vendor: affected per the vendor's record; this train is not in the vendor's fix table
R81 (EOS)R81Not stated by vendor: affected per the vendor's record; this train is not in the vendor's fix table

4Can't patch tonight?

Check Point's mitigation: stop the dynamic_server process and prevent it from restarting, by running:

> dbset process:dynamic_server
> dbset :save

Caveat: stopping it makes the Dynamic CLI commands listed in sk144112 fail. To turn it back on later, run:

> dbset process:dynamic_server t
> dbset :save

To confirm the mitigation took effect, Check Point gives this command (Expert mode) to see whether dynamic_server is still running; a line ending in /usr/bin/dynamic_server means it is. On its own it doesn't show whether a box is patched: use the socket check under Am I affected.

> ps auxw | grep -v grep | grep 'dynamic_server'

In the output, look at the /usr/bin/dynamic_server line.

Copy the first dbset command as Check Point gives it, with nothing after process:dynamic_server; the command to turn it back on is the same line with t added. The mitigation reduces exposure; the Jumbo Hotfix takes are the fix. our analysis

Where to run the dbset commands (which shell, and whether on every cluster member and management server): Not stated by vendor.

5Was I hit?

The vulnerable daemon logs every command it receives to /var/log/dynamicCli.log. Legitimate requests use this Clish wrapper: "Received = #524288# . /opt/CPshared/5.0/tmp/.CPprofile.sh >> /dev/null; export SP_DISTRIBUTE=0; set -o noglob; <Gaia binary> 2>&1". Any command that doesn't use it may indicate a command was executed as root through the socket, and needs investigating.

Check Point's checks, to run on each Check Point Force Firewall or cluster member. Received commands that don't use the expected Clish wrapper:

> grep "Received =" /var/log/dynamicCli.log | grep -vF "CPprofile.sh >> /dev/null; export SP_DISTRIBUTE=0; set -o noglob;"

In the output, look at the Received = line.

Use of the system() sink, which Check Point says is uncommon or absent in legitimate traffic:

> grep -F "Received = #return_value#" /var/log/dynamicCli.log

Commands commonly associated with exploitation attempts: Check Point gives a grep of /var/log/dynamicCli.log for them in the advisory (see the link). Source ↗

After the fix, blocked attempts are logged. Look for "Rejected connection from unauthorized uid": a non-zero or unexpected UID (for example 99, nobody) indicates an escalation attempt that was blocked. Check Point says to correlate bursts of rejected connections with portal/web and authentication logs to find the source.

> grep "Rejected connection from unauthorized uid" /var/log/dynamicCli.log

CISA's catalog flags this CVE for forensic triage, and its required action points to CISA's BOD 26-04 guidance and its Forensics Triage Requirements. Source ↗

6Sources

Summary of public vendor guidance. Verify against the vendor advisory before acting.

See CVE-2026-123039 in the exploited-now list (exploit likelihood, CISA's description, deadline).